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PROCEDURAL SANCTIONS FOR NON-REGISTRATION OF
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF THEIR
APPLICATION TO NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
B issues a negotiable instrument to A. The instrument is transferred
to C, an unregistered foreign corporation, and then to Z, who seeks re-
covery against B. The effect of the typical foreign corporation registra-
tion statute is to require Z to prove that he is a holder in due course or
possibly to lose on a defense totally unrelated to the original transaction on
which the instrument was based.
Since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, a primary sanction
for non-registration of foreign corporations has been the imposition of a
procedural disability which denies a corporation the right to sue in the
courts of the state whose law it has so offended.' Despite criticism,2 a
majority of states3 has retained the procedural disability, and it has been
recommended for future legislation by the Model Business Corporation
Act." In contrast the operative characteristics of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code articles governing negotiable instruments remove impediments
to transfer, in large part by giving the holder of an instrument procedural
advantages.5
A significant conflict between these two statutes demands examina-
1. E.g., N.Y. Bus. Copp. L. § 1312 (McKinney 1963 Repl.). A few states make
the contracts void; e.g., Amc. STAT. ANN. § 64-1202 (1966 Repl.). Under the rule of
David Lupton & Sons Co. v. Auto. Club, 225 U.S. 489 (1912), these statutes were not
enforced in the federal courts. After Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)
and Woods v. Interstate Realty, 337 U.S. 535 (1949), the converse of this rule was held
to govern.
2. See Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: The Loss of Reason, 47 N.C. L. REv.
1, 733 (1969) [hereinafter Walker] ; Note, Foreign Corporations: The Interrelation of
Jurisdiction and Qualification, 33 IND. L.J. 358 (1958) ; but see, Note, Sanctions for
Failure to Comply with Corporate Qualification Statutes: An Evaluation, 63 COL. L.
REv. 117 (1963).
3. Kansas provides no sanction: KAN. GEr. STAT. ANN. § 17-501 (1963). Five
jurisdictions impose only a fine: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 378 (Supp. 1968) ; GA. CODE
ANN. § 22-1506 (1964) ; Ky. REv. STAT. § 271.990 (1962); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 14 §
2406 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1106 (1964 Repl.). ARic. STAT. ANN. § 64-1202
(1966 Repl.) makes a contract in violation void.
4. MODEL Bus. CoRP. AcT § 117:
No foreign corporation transacting business in this State without a certificate
of authority shall be permitted to maintain any action, suit or proceeding in any
court of this State, until such corporation shall have obtained a certificate of
authority. Nor shall any action, suit or proceeding be maintained in any court
of this State by any successor or assignee of such corporation . . . arising out
of the transaction of business by such corporation.
5. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-307.
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tion, particularly since the contemporary justification for registration is
itself subject to serious question.6
THE DISABILITY TO SUE AND NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
The foreign corporation's disability to sue extends to any ". . . action,
suit or proceeding in any court . . . ."' No statutory language exempts
suits on negotiable instruments from the class of barred actions ;8 and the
courts have held uniformly that the disability extends to suits on negoti-
able instruments.9 The Uniform Commercial Code does not deal specifi-
cally with this problem. Section 3-305 (2) (b), which deals with incapacity
and illegality as real defenses, is accompanied by official comments indica-
ting that this sort of question is to be left to local law."
The incapacity and illegality referred to in section 3-305 (2) (b) go
to the validity of a contract itself, not to the right of a party to demand
enforcement. The importance of this distinction in the registration con-
text may be illustrated by comparing the fate of a contract under the
Arkansas and Indiana foreign corporation registration statutes." In
Pacific National Bank v. Hernreich,1 2 an Arkansas case, notes were made
payable to an unregistered foreign corporation pursuant to a sale of
jewelry. The note was held to be void and unenforcible even by one not
in violation of the registration statute:
The effect of this [statute] is to render a transaction of this kind
not merely unenforceable but void ab initio. Accordingly there
can be no holder in due course here of a negotiable instrument
arising out of this illegal transaction.'
In Arkansas the sanction for non-registration goes to the validity of
the contract itself. Indiana's foreign corporation registration statute,
however, goes not to the contract's validity but to the right of an aggrieved
party to enter the courtroom:
6. Walker, note 2 supra, launched a massive attack on the registration requirement,
suggested that none of the traditional justifications for registration retain any validity
and concluded that all such statutes should be abandoned. See also Note, Foreign Cor-
porations: The Interrelation of Jurisdiction and Qualification, 33 IND. L.J. 358 (1958).
7. MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 117.
8. Texas, however, specifically excludes holders in due course from the penalty.
TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 8.18 (1956).
9. E.g., Allison Hill Trust Co. v. Sarandrea, 236 App. Div. 189, 258 N.Y.S. 299
(1932), aff'g 134 Misc. 566, 236 N.Y.S. 265 (Sup. Ct. 1929) (dealing with a bill of
exchange).
10. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305, Comment 5.
11. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-1202 (1966 Repl.) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-314 (Burns
1960 Repl.).
12. 240 Ark. 114, 398 S.W.2d 221 (1966).
13. Id. at 118, 398 S.W.2d at 223.
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The penalty provision closing Indiana courts to foreign corpora-
tions violating the qualification provisions is easily avoided. It
has been held repeatedly that even though the plaintiff foreign
corporation violated the registration provisions in the very
transaction upon which it sues, the penalty provided in Section
25-314 will not apply so as to prevent suit if the certificate of
admission is secured prior to commencement of the action.1
As is the case in a majority of jurisdictions," Indiana's penalty for
non-registration goes to enforceability, not to validity of the contract
itself; and so it is not "... such.., illegality.., as renders the obligation
of a party a nullity...
Section 3-306 provides that those who do not have the rights of a
holder in due course are subject to all defenses available on a "simple
contract." The broad inclusiveness of this section's language would
indicate that the disability to sue should be treated no differently than
any other defense in contract. Even if the disability to sue is not a
"defense," strictly construed, the same result is indicated, since the Code
is generally all-inclusive in its acceptance of those limitations placed on
contract rights by other areas of the law when applied to holders not in
due course. The drafters of the Code indicated on this point that:
It is obvious we cannot hope to affect the gaming or usury
statutes [of the states], to say nothing of all the others, and
again their effect must be left to local law.'
Is is apparent, then, that the non-registration of a foreign corporation
is a real defense only in such states as Arkansas where the contract is
void and that non-registration may constitute a defense against a holder
without the rights of a holder in due course. The significance of each of
these points lies, in part, in their cumulative effect. The problems raised
by non-registration are resolved only in a general fashion, such as the
distinction between real defenses and those on a simple contract, and,
therefore, any further analysis must proceed without explicit guidance
by the Code.
Under case law, the unregistered foreign corporation which holds a
negotiable instrument cannot sue to enforce it," even if the maker knew
14. Green v. Robertshaw-Fulton Controls Co., 204 F. Supp. 117, 132 (S.D. Ind.
1962).
15. See note 3 supra.
16. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305(2) (b).
17. UNiFORM CommzRcIAL CoDE (Tentative Draft 2, Art. III), Notes and Com-
ments § 48 (1947).
18. See W. FLETCHFR, 17 CoRwoRATioNs § 8536 (perm. ed. 1960). The finance
company whose only business is the collection of debt is not doing business and is, ap-
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that he was dealing with an unregistered corporation."0
In a majority" of jurisdictions the unregistered corporation's dis-
ability to sue extends to its assignees. A provision to this effect has been
adopted by the Model Business Corporation Act."' Extention of the
disability to assignees is necessary to prevent avoidance of the statutes by
the simple expedient of transferring the corporation's rights to another
corporation or person who could bring suit. The assignor corporation,
having received value for the rights, would, if not subject to the dis-
ability, suffer no economic detriment. Since the assigned contract could
be enforced, the assignee would have no reason to compel his assignor to
register.22
The registration statutes which extend the disability to sue to
assignees do not provide a specific exemption for the transferee of a
negotiable instrument. 2 Nor does the case law construing such language
provide an exemption for the transferee of a negotiable instrument.
Section 3-306, by allowing all defenses available on a simple contract,
makes it clear that, as to the basic effect of such defenses, the holder is
in no radically different position than any other assignee. The special
status of the holder and holder in due course stems not from any basic
difference in characterization but from advantages given in factual situa-
tions which are specifically delineated, such as on the question of notice;
and of course the holder has certain advantages in the burden of proof.
The literal application of this rationale would extend the disability
to sue to all assignees, regardless of their character, and regardless of the
preferences and advantages accorded to the holder and holder in due
course by the Uniform Commercial Code. This radical extension has not
been made. In dealing with three types of transferees-holders with
notice, holders without notice but not in due course and holders in due
course-the courts have sought to protect the advantages given by the
parently, therefore not subject to the disability to sue. Central Bergin Supply Co. v.
V.L. Consiglio Inc., 35 Misc. 2d 146, 230 N.Y.S. 2d 84 (Sup. Ct. 1961) ; MODEL BusINEss
CORPORATION ACT § 99(h).
19. E.g., Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Munday, 168 Wis. 31, 168 N.W. 393 (1918)
but cf. Pancoast v. Travelers Co., 79 Ind. 172 (1881).
20. Those jurisdictions which explicitly limit assignee rights are: ALA. CODE tit.
10 § 21(89) (1967 Supp.) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 23 § 91, 93 (Supp. 1968) ; N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-144 (1965 Repl.) ; N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. § 1312 (McKinney 1963); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 7-2-28 (1956); S.D. Coiip. L. § 47-8-30 (1967); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
180.847 (Supp. 1969), in addition to Model Business Corporation Act jurisdictions.
21. MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 117.
22. Lewis v. Club Realty Co. 264 Mass. 588, 163 N.E. 172, 173 (1928), construing
MAsS. ANN. LAWS ch. 181, § 5 (1969), reaches the same result without an explicit statu-
tory limitation of assignee rights.
23. E.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 117. The only exception is Texas,
which excludes holders in due course; TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 8.18 (1956).
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law of negotiable instruments. In each case there is a different degree of
success.
To prevent its avoidance, the procedural disability has been held to
extend to the holder of a negotiable instrument with notice that it is the
transferee of an unregistered foreign corporation.24 Thus in Southern
Discount Co. v. Rose," the directors and officers of a corporation which
had not complied with the appropriate registration statute organized a
second corportaion which was not subject to the disability to sue. This
second corporation then took a negotiable instrument for collection from
the first corporation. The court imputed the knowledge of the first
company to the second and, having found notice, denied recovery for
non-compliance with the registration statute.
In the case of a holder who is without notice of non-registration but
does not hold in due course, there is a potential conflict between pre-Code
cases and the current law. Case law does not raise this point explicitly.
In Williams v. Cheney"8 an insurance company had not registered to do
business in Massachusetts; accordingly, its contracts were subject to a
disability to sue. In resolving the question of against whom this defense
would be good, the court noted:
But it is equally clear and well settled that, if the consideration
of a negotiable security is against the law, yet the security can-
not be avoided on that account in the hands of a bona fide holder,
who is not privy to the illegality of the consideration."
Assuming that good faith as used in this case is not an element totally
distinct from notice of illegality, the question to be asked is the existence
of notice. Similarly, in Alliston Hill Trust Co. v. Sarandrea,8 it was held
that a holder in due course could not be defeated by the non-registration
of his transferor; however the court said the defense would be available
against all assignees ". . . except as to negotiable paper taken in good
24. E.g., Husseyni v. Rappaport, 127 F. Supp. 144 (D.C. Minn. 1954). The literal
language of Uniform Commercial Code § 3-304(5) suggests that the failure of a corpora-
tion to register with the appropriate secretary of state would not of itself constitute no-
tice and thereby open an assignee to the non-registration defense: "The filing or record-
ing of a document does not of itself constitute notice within the provisions of the Article
to a person who would otherwise be a holder in due course."
The definition of notice in § 1-201(25) (c) (where from all the facts or circum-
stances one should have knowledge) might deal with the problem of the discount opera-
tion which consistently takes negotiable instruments from an unregistered corporation.
Perhaps mere knowledge of continuous operation in one state should lead the discount
company to investigate the matter.
25. 290 S.W. 861 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927), rev'd on other grounds, 296 S.W. 482
(Tex. 1927).
26. 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 215 (1855).
27. Id. at 222.
28. 236 App. Div. 189, 258 N.Y.S. 299 (1932).
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faith from the corporation. . ."" The focus of the test is not holder in
due course status but the good faith of the holder. Authority on this
point" dates back to Kyd's Bills of Exchange:
Where the original transaction, however, is not morally bad,
its illegality arising only from its being prohibited by a positive
statute, everything done in consequence of the prohibited act,
will not of course be considered as void."'
However questionable analysis suggesting malum in se distinctions may
be, Kyd and the pre-Code case law are consistent in their minimization of
the effect of this type of sanction-the disability to sue-in the negotiable
instruments context.
A contrary position, however, as to holders without notice of non-
registration but not holders in due course may be based on the Code:
Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person
takes the instrument subject to... (b) all defenses of any party
which would be available in an action on a simple contract. 2
No reported case has specifically considered this Code provision in
reference to the procedural disability for non-registration." The dis-
ability is not a complete defense but only a procedural impediment which
is removed if the corporation registers. 4 But the Code provision does
indicate that a holder was not intended to be in a better position than the
transferor as to the defenses assertable against him. The policy of the Code
may not be violated by allowing the assertion of the procedural disability
against the transferee-holder.
The position of the case law has considerable strength. Imposing the
disability on holders without notice serves little function. Not having
notice of non-registration, they will have no reason not to deal with the
corporation. An innocent party is penalized while the corporation remains
whole. Criticism should not be directed at the law of negotiable instru-
ments, since it only mirrors in this matter the registration statute.3
It is the procedural disability which needs to be clarified with respect to
29. Id. at 192, 258 N.Y.S. at 303.
30. See Ayer v. Hutchins, 4 Mass. (4 Tyng) 370 (1808); Williams v. Cheney, 69
Mass. (3 Gray) 215 (1855) ; Halsey v. Henry Jewett Dramatic Co., 190 N.Y. 231, 83
N.E. 25 (1907) ; Allison Hill Trust Co. v. Sarandrea, 236 App. Div. 189, 258 N.Y.S. 299
(1932).
31. S. KYD, Bills of Exchange 277 (1808).
32. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-306.
33. Cases in this area are quite dated; e.g., Zick v. Dick, 1 Ind. App. 269, 27 N.E.
622 (1891).
34. E.g., N.J. REv. STAT. § 14:15-4 (1939).
35. See text accompanying note 16 supra. It might be argued that the Code should
mirror not only the statute but case law as well.
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all assignees without notice.
The argument which would exempt assignees without notice because
of lack of deterrent effect applies with equal force to the holder in due
course. Further, to protect transferability, the law favors the holder in
due course by limiting the defenses available against him and according
him certain procedural advantages. The contrary position, that holders in
due course should not be free of the disability to sue, was argued and
rejected in Allison Hill Trust Co. v. Sarandrea,8 where the court dealt
with a statute specifically extending the disabilities imposed on foreign
corporations to "assignees." 7 It was held that to extend this sanction to
holders in due course was so drastic a disability that it would be followed
only at the express command of the legislature.3 8 Any other result
would ". . . embarass the business operation. . . "" of those who need to
discount their obligations by negotiation. This is the result reached in
the great majority of cases.4" Texas is the only state with a statutory
exemption of holders in due course from the disability.4
Those jurisdictions which apply the disability to assignees without
notice do so on the ground that their registration statutes make the
contracts of non-complying corporations void ab initio, 2 which, as
noted above would make non-registration a real defense. However, it
should be noted that when the legislature of Missouri modified its registra-
tion statute so that such contracts were not explicitly made void,4" the
courts of that state were not at all reluctant to remove the disability
placed on the holder in due course.4"
The Uniform Commercial Code may dictate the same result. To the
extent that a holder is a holder in due course, he takes the instrument free
from ". . . (2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom
the holder has not dealt. . . ."" Under this provision, if the procedural
disability is the sort of defense referred to, it is not applicable to the
holder in due course. Or, if the disability is not a "defense," the Code
has expressed its policy to free this type of holder from most infirmities
and impediments to recovery by its explicit and limited treatment of real
36. 236 App. Div. 189, 258 N.Y.S. 299 (1932).
37. N.Y. Laws of 1923, c. 787 (Stock Corp. L. § 110).
38. See 258 N.Y.S. at 302, citing Vallett v. Parker, 6 Wend. 615, 622 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
1831).
39. Id.
40. E.g., Credit Industrial Co. v. Happel, Inc., 252 Iowa 213, 106 N.W.2d 667
(1960).
41. See note 8 srupra.
42. See note 14 ,rupra.
43. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1026 (1899), now Mo. ANN. STAT. 351:635 (1966).
44. Salitan v. Carter, Taley & Dinwiddie, 332 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. App. 1960).
45. U NIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
defenses in section 3-305. As noted above, non-registration is not a real
defense under section 3-305 (2) (b), since illegality must be such as would
render ".... the obligation a nullity ... ""
But the case law analysis which considers the applicability of the non-
registration procedural disability in terms of the character of the holder
is not adequate. Initially, in litigation, the question does not arise in
those terms. The Code sets out the order of pleading and proof for
recovery as follows:
After it is shown that a defense exists a person claiming the
rights of a holder in due course has the burden of establishing
that he or some person under whom he claims is in all respects
a holder in due course."
It is only after a defense has been established, " . . . not only in the first
instance but by a preponderance of the total evidence... "" that the
holder must come forward to show a taking in due course. This is the
procedural advantage given by the Code to holders in order to promote
negotiability.
Under section 3-307 matters pertaining to the order and burden of
proof in the trial itself are spelled out in some detail. However the section
may not fit the case where an infirmity is imposed for the non-registration
of a foreign corporation. As a jurisdictional matter, the issue is raised by
a plea in abatement."9 It is a preliminary question of standing that arises
outside of the Code provisions for order of proof in the trial on the merits.
If it is readily apparent to the court that there has not been compliance
with the registration statute, specific facts need not be alleged ;" however
the burden is on the defendant, and he normally must aver specific facts
of non-compliance, not a conclusory allegation.5' The plaintiff, in order
to proceed with the suit, must either disprove the fact averred or except
himself from the penalty. The plaintiff must prove that he is a holder in
due course or show that the transferor was not required to register.
Allowing the non-registration defense to force proof of due course status
46. Id. 2 (b).
47. Id. § 3-307. See generally Bigham, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof and the
U.C.C., 21 VAND. L. REv. 177 (1968).
48. UNIFORI COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-307, Comment (2).
49. Alligator Oil Clothing Co. v. Baseel, 117 Ore. 527, 244 P. 661 (1926). It is
agreed that this is a preliminary matter, although some cases have held that the proper
procedure is a plea in bar. H. H. King Flour Mills Co. v. Bay City Baking Co., 240
Mich. 79, 214 N.W. 973 (1927). Indiana has required a plea in abatement. Warren Co.
v. Exodus, 114 Ind. App. 563, 53 N.E.2d 546 (1944).
50. Mapel Motor Co. v. Beales, 110 N.Y.S.2d 623, 624 (County Ct. 1951).
51. Hamshire Silver Co. v. Hill, 244 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951);
Proctor and Gamble Co. v. King County, 9 Wash. 2d 655, 115 P.2d 962 (1941).
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is significant, since the question can be raised with such ease. Even if the
defendant must go beyond averring the facts, to establish his defense
all he need do is to find one endorser who should have, but has not,
registered as a foreign corporation; this could probably be accomplished
by a brief telephone call to the appropriate secretary of state's office.
Aside from the change in order itself, this observation raises several
collateral issues. Since the Code has not dealt explicitly with preliminary
matters, do the comments to section 3-307,52 which require a heavy
burden to be upheld by the person asserting a defense, apply? Resolution
of the matter may vary, in contrast to the Code's attempt at unification,
from state to state with the requirements of a plea in abatement, or with
general local law on preliminary matters.53
HISTORIC AND CONTEMPORARY JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DISABILITY
The territorial-power concept of jurisdiction, as expressed in Pen-
noyer v. Neff, 4 provided an impetus for requiring the registration of
foreign corporations. A state had jurisdiction only to the extent a
corporation was "present" or consented to that jurisdiction.
The New York Civil Procedure Code of 1877, provided that service
of process might be brought upon a "... cashier, a director, or a managing
agent of the corporation within the state."5 But an Indiana corporation
in New York could simply withdraw its agents from New York and
thereby present an almost insurmountable procedural obstacle-service of
process. The remedies of litigants against foreign corporations were
thwarted too easily.
As corporations increasingly became involved in multistate trans-
actions, states began to search for devices to obtain jurisdiction over them
and thereby protect the interests of their own residents as plaintiffs. To
deal with the problem, legislatures required the registration of foreign
corporations and designation of an agent to receive process. In effect,
the foreign corporation was coerced into "consenting" to the state's
52. UNIFORM COa AIERCIAI. CODE § 3-307, Comment 3.
53. It is interesting to note that § 3-307 was written to overcome a similar problem
in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law § 59. See Bigham, note 47 supra.
54. 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877), citing D'Arcy v. Ketchem 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165
(1850) :
The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits
of the State in which it is established. Any attempt to exercise authority be-
yond those limits would be deemed assumption of power and be resisted as mere
abuse.
55. N.Y. Civil Procedure Code of 1877 c. 32 at 108. At one point the problem was
further compounded by the question of whether it was possible to bring service of
process on a corporation's agent outside of that state which had given the corporation its
legal existence. Barnett v. Chicago and Lake Huron R.R. Co., 4 Hun. 114, 6 N.Y. Sup.
Ct. (T.&C.) 358 (1875), construing N.Y. Civil Procedure Code of 1855 § 134.
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jurisdiction."
The states uniformly imposed some sanction on the foreign cor-
poration which failed to register. Pennsylvania went so far as to provide
a criminal penalty." The more usual penalty was the disability to sue. 8
Contemporary penalties vary in detail,59 but as a basis most statues
provide the "no access to the court" procedural disability. Some variety
remains, however. In Arkansas the contracts of an unregistered foreign
corporation are "void ab initio."' 6  Indiana provides a fine which may
range as high as 10,000 dollars,"' although most monetary sanctions are
1,000 dollars or less.62
When jurisdiction was limited by the teritorial power concept,
registration was defensible.63 In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,64
however, the Supreme Court held that the state of Washington could
serve a corporation which had operated with a number of agents in the
state with process outside the state. Moreover, McGee v. International
Life Insurance Co. 5 held a single transaction to be sufficient ground on
which to base service of process. The legislatures took advantage of this
opportunity by passing long-arm statutes which make a single contract
56. The enactment of these statutes ranged over a considerable period of time. It
is interesting to note that the statutes operated quite independently of any state policy to
attract corporations, or perhaps on account of that same policy. In Delaware, response
to the problem went so far as an article in the constitution of 1897: "No foreign corpora-
tion shall do any business in this state, without having an authorized agent . . . upon
whom legal process may be served." DEL. CoNsT. art. 9 § 5 (1897).
57. Pa. Gen. State. no. 33 at 108 (1874) (thirty days imprisonment and a fine up
to $1,000).
58. For a discussion of the types of contractual penalties in force at the beginning
of the twentieth century, see Model Heating Co. v. Majarity, 25 Del. 459, 467, 81 A. 394,
397 (1911) (void, inability to sue, inability to sue until registration). The various juris-
dictions also used (and continue to use) retaliatory statutes which place the same lia-
bilities on a foreign corporation as applied to foreign corporations in its home state;
e.g. Comm'r of Ins. v. Equity Gen. Ins. Co., 346 Mass. 233, 191 N.E.2d 139 (1963), con-
struing MAss. STAT. ANN. c. 175 § 159 (1959).
59. See 1 P-H CORPORATAON SERVICE 11 958; 1 CCH CORP. L. GuIDE f 1061. In
Hawaii, Wisconsin and Nevada there is a disability to defend as well as to sue. HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 418-10 (1969) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.847 (Rev. 1969); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 80.210 (1967).
60. Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Hernreich, 240 Ark. 114, 398 S.W.2d 221 (1966), construing
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-1202 (1966 Repl.).
61. IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-314 (Burns 1960 Repl.).
62. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. 64-1205 (1966 Repl.); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23 § 93
(1966). There is no evidence, in reported cases, that these fines are enforced actively.
Lack of enforcement was also indicated in a survey taken in connection with Note,
Sanctions for Failure to Comply with Corporate Qualification Statutes: An Evaluation,
63 COL. L. REV. 117 (1963).
63. E.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
64. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
65. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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made or performed the basis for jurisdiction.6 The bite of Pennoyer v.
Neff67 was gone.
W. Walker, in his article Foreign Corporation Laws: The Loss of
Reason,"' has based a broadside attack on the registration statutes on
the advent of long-arm jurisdiction.69 Walker rightly points out that the
statutes were passed originally to protect litigants who sought service of
process against foreign corporations. The need for such protection is
dismissed after an examination of International Shoe Co. v. Washington"
and the law which followed that decision. Enforcement of tax laws against
the foreign corporations is not found to be benefitted, since the same or
more effective results could be achieved by direct action of the taxing
authority."' Further there is a positive economic deteriment in the
requirement of registrationY.7  The only groups which benefit from the
statutes seem to be attorneys and such organizations as the Corporation
Trust Co.7 ' The arguments for immediate repeal of the registration
statutes are strong but not conclusive.
If an agent is designated by the registered foreign corporation to
receive process, service is effected upon presentation of the papers. In
contrast, the statutes based on International Shoe Co. v. Washington7
may depend for their effectiveness on the efficiency of the secretary of
state's office. Suppose a restraining order is sought against the corpora-
66. IowA CODE ANat. § 617.3 (Supp. 1969), construed in Cedar Rapids Community
School Dist. v. R. F. Ball Const. Co., 237 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Iowa 1965).
However, in analyzing McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), it is not
a simple matter to say that a lower quantum of activity is required for long-arm juris-
diction than for registration and that the registration statutes are, therefore, anachron-
istic. States may have the option of setting the registration quantum differently; cf. Wor-
cester Felt Pad Corp. v. Tucson Airport Authority, 233 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1956). Com-
pare S.D. Comp. L. § 47-8-30 (1967), where the transaction of "any business" necessi-
tates registration, and S.D. CODE § 11.2002 (1939), where registration is required only
if corporations "hold property."
Further, the contention that enactment of a long-arm statute impliedly repeals a
registration statute by lowering the quantum of business required was rejected in Wal-
rus Mfg. Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 184 F. Supp. 214 (S.D. Ill. 1960).
67. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
68. Walker, note 2 supra.
69. The reason for foreign corporation laws has ceased. The troublesome
panoply of applications for admission, charter copies, designated agents, con-
tract defaults and the rest is now only a relic .... The error is nationwide.
Id. at 1.
70. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
71. Walker, 743-46. The author also criticizes the use of registration as a tax de-
vice on the grounds that less contact is required constitutionally to tax than to require
registration, citing Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450 (1959) (income tax) and Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954) (sales
tax). Id. at 746.
72. Id. at 753-60.
73. Id. at 757.
74. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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tion to prevent a "grave and immediate harm." Service of process
can be achieved under either statute, but one depends for its efficiency
on the operations of a governmental office, the other on finding a
registered agent. Although it is only of occasional importance, the dif-
ference may be critical to a litigant who is presently being damaged and
seeks immediate relief. In New York, service of process through the
secretary of state's office may take up to thirty days.7" And even after
proof of service is filed with the clerk of the appropriate court there is a
ten-day waiting period before the service of process is deemed effective."8
Even if the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act,77
relied upon by Walker as a paradigm, is in force in a particular juris-
diction, benefits remain in the registration of foreign corporation. Before
service of process can take place to acquire in personam jurisdiction, the
litigant must have some idea of whom he is going to serve. The litigant
may not be seeking to find a large nationally-known corporation but a
corporation about whom little is known within the litigant's own juris-
diction. Registration of the foreign corporation would provide a known
agent for service of process.
Under the logic of McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,7
the connection required between a foreign corporation and the jurisdiction
involved is greatly reduced. But the question is not foreclosed. However
spuriously, the corporation may contest the fact that any connection
existed between it and the state. The application of the long-arm statute
itself may be challenged on due process grounds. These questions in
almost all cases may be decided adversely to the corporation; but for the
weak litigant the questions themselves may spell disaster. On the other
hand, if an agent is designated to receive process, the corporation hardly
can deny its existence in the state. Here the question is foreclosed by the
corporation's own act. However, a greater showing of activity might be
required for registration than for long-arm jurisdiction."9
If the retention of registration can be justified on service of process
grounds, there should be little objection to the implementation of other
state policies through the device of registration.
"It is as important to a state to provide for the suability, the proper
conduct and solvency of foreign corporations in the state as of domestic
75. N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. § 307 (McKinney 1969 Supp.).
76. Id.
77. UNIFORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 307
(1966).
78. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
79. See note 66 supra.
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ones."8 The regulations of the state will of course vary with its policies.
There may be a requirement that books of the foreign corporation be
made available to qualified persons."' The practical importance of this
sort of regulation was demonstrated In re Jewish Consumptives' Relief
Society.82 There a Colorado corporation had been organized to operate a
hospital in New York state. Pursuant to the registration law of New
York, the corporation had filed a statement of its purposes.8 Later the
corporation wished to amend the provision by application to the New
York courts. This action brought the attention and then intervention of
the Attorney General, who objected on the grounds that the corporation
was in financial difficulty in Colorado. To regulate a foreign corporation,
the state must know that it is in the state and the nature of its operations.
This knowledge is provided by registration and the information filed
with registration.
There is, however, no unique value in the procedural disability as a
sanction for non-registration. Even when service of process was a burning
issue, the disability was a windfall to parties adverse to the corporation.
In an action brought by the corporation, it had already subjected itself to
the jurisdiction of the state for that litigation. It is apparent that the
disability to sue is not of necessity tied to the need for the designation of
an agent for service of process.
Elimination of the procedural disability would avoid a conflict with
procedural devices in the Code which encourage transferability. An alter-
native to the disability to sue might be the fine, which would have the
additional advantage of paying for its own administration."
The state may not know, however, just which corporations are
violating its registration statutes. A state might solve this problem by
employing the procedural disability. A private party, adverse to the
corporation, could be depended upon to exercise his own rights at no
cost to the state and with an immediate loss to the corporation. Further,
80. G. HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTION LAw (1918). Though tangential to the scope of this paper it should be noted
that there are continuing constitutional problems in the area of local regulation of for-
eign corporations. For the kinds of questions which may be raised see, Kaplan, Foreign
Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L. REv. 433 (1968).
81. McCormack v. Statler Hotels Delaware Corp., 55 Ill. App. 2d 21, 203 N.E.2d
697 (1964).
82. It re Jewish Consumptives' Relief Society, 196 Misc. 579, 92 N.Y.S. 2d 673
(1949). While this was a charitable corporation, the provisions of N.Y. GEN. CORP. L. §
210 (McKinney 1943) are comparable to N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. § 1312 et seq. (McKinney
1963).
83. NEW YORK GEN. CORP. L. § 10 (McKinney 1943).
84. Note, Foreign Corporations: The Interrelations of Jurisdiction and Qualifica-
tion, 38 IND. L.J. 358 (1958).
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the corporation might be willing to run the risk of even a 10,000 dollar85
penalty but would not jeopardize the enforceability of its contracts.
CONCLUSION
It would be presumptuous to define a specific course of action to
resolve the problems suggested above. Registration of foreign corporations
and the disability to sue may be anachronisms left in the wake of
International Shoe. If, however, there is even the minimal need noted
above for requiring registration after the expansion of long-arm juris-
diction, the disability to sue is a remedy which has at least enough merit
to be considered in implementation of that need.
Perhaps it is the Uniform Commercial Code which is in need of
revision." In light of the multitude of state regulations which might have
tangential effect on negotiable instruments, however, it is difficult to
see how the Code could avoid the general terms of sections 3-305,
3-306 and 3-307.
The problem may be compounded by current disquiet over the status
of negotiable instrument holders." The non-registration defense is simple
to establish. The defendant need only contact the appropriate secretary of
state's office to see if any transferee has failed to comply with the registra-
tion statute. The inexpensive nature of this defense would, of course,
make it attractive to the same kind of litigant as would be protected under
proposed consumer credit legislation.88
Yet it would be singularly inappropriate for the courts or legislatures
to give the disability to sue a life of its own, based on consumer protection
problems, independant of any justification for registration, since the dis-
ability would affect not only the consumer transaction but all negotiable
paper.
85. IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-314 (Burns 1960 Repl.)
86. For contrasting views of the effectiveness of the Uniform Commercial Code in
matters of procedure see Bigham, Presumptions, Burdens of Proof and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 21 VAND. L. Rxv. 177 (1968) and Kinyon, Actions on Commercial Pa-
per: Holder's Procedural Advantages Under Article Three, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 1441
(1967).
87. E.g., UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 2.403 et seq., which forbids the use of
negotiable instruments in consumer credit transactions.
88. Reference is made here, for example, to the sales finance company in transac-
tions which involve the small consumer, as described in B. CURRAN, TRENDS IN CON-
SUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 7 (1965):
Such companies initially entered the consumer credit market in the second
decade of the twentieth century in connection with the financing of automobile
paper. Since that time they have participated in the market primarily as pur-
chasers of credit contract negotiated initially by buyers and sellers of specific
goods. Expansion of the interest of sales finance companies in consumer credit
has been through the acquisition of paper favoring a variety of consumer goods
and services. . . . Sales finance companies may be operated on a nation-wide
basis with local offices in many states. ...
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The legislatures have, most probably by inadvertance, or as the
result of a possibly anachronistic survival, provided issuers of a negotiable
instrument with an inexpensive defense totally unrelated to the merits
of the underlying transaction itself. Further, the order of proof established
for negotiable instruments is weakened by the ease with which the defense
can be raised. The signficance of this result and a lack of contemporary
consideration suggest the necessity for legislative re-evaluation.
JOHN P. MITCHELL
